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Abstract
This article seeks to understand the significance of Celestina (1499) as it moves through 
time. It contends that new meanings emerge when the context in which the work is 
printed and read changes. As the prologue to the Tragicomedia intimates, each new act of 
engagement brings to the fore meanings that may not have been intended or even con-
ceivable at the point of its composition. Taking a synchronic and comparative approach, 
the article looks at the ‘horizon of expectations’ of Celestina’s reception in sixteenth-
century Spain and Italy, when at the height of its popularity. Focusing on the issues of 
self-knowledge and solitude, it contextualises their portrayal within ideological debates 
about the misery and dignity of man that circulated in the Renaissance and within an en-
vironment that was considering the possibility of disbelief. It juxtaposes Celestina against 
other contemporary texts involved in this supranational debate, such as Fernán Pérez de 
Oliva’s Diálogo de la dignidad del hombre (1546). It argues that, in this new horizon, Ce-
lestina’s portrayal of self-knowledge and solitude and its engagement with debates about 
the misery and dignity of man goes beyond its medieval origins.
Keywords
Celestina; reception; Diálogo de la dignidad del hombre; miseria hominis; dignitas hominis; 
Innocent III, Petrarch; nosce te ipsum; solitude; misery and dignity of man; self-knowledge
1. My thanks go to the Society for Renaissance Studies for their generous Study Fellowship, 
which allowed me a period of research in the Biblioteca Nacional de España, the results of which 
contributed to this article.
316 Rachel Scott
Studia Aurea, 8, 2014
Resumen
«Nuevas sentencias sentía»: la recepción de La Celestina y la miseria y la dignidad del hombre
Este artículo pretende entender el significado de La Celestina a través de su recepción. 
Sostiene que surgen nuevos sentidos cuando cambia el contexto en el que la obra se im-
prima y se lee. Como sugiere el prólogo de la Tragicomedia, cada interacción textual re-
salta nuevos significados que pueden sobrepasar los del momento en el que se concibió. 
Utilizando un método sincrónico y comparativo, analiza el ‘horizonte de expectativas’ 
de la recepción de La Celestina en España e Italia del siglo dieciséis cuando alcanzó el 
momento cumbre de su popularidad. Se centra en los conceptos de nosce te ipsum y de la 
soledad, contextualizando su representación en los debates ideológicos sobre la miseria y 
la dignidad del hombre que circulaban en el Renacimiento y en un ambiente que exami-
naba la posibilidad del ateísmo. Yuxtapone La Celestina con otros textos que formaban 
parte de este debate supranacional tal como el Diálogo de la dignidad del hombre por 
Fernán Pérez de Oliva (1546). Mantiene que la representación del autoconocimiento y 
de la soledad por La Celestina y su relación con los debates sobre la condición humana 
superan sus origines medievales en este nuevo horizonte. 
Palabras clave
La Celestina; recepción; Diálogo de la dignidad del hombre; miseria hominis; dignitas 
hominis; Inocencio III, Petrarca; nosce te ipsum; soledad; miseria y dignidad del hombre; 
autoconocimiento
“En su processo nuevas sentencias sentía”
Rather than representing a fixed and static object that is passively received by an 
audience Celestina by Fernando de Rojas (1499) exemplifies the process-like na-
ture of textual creation, development, and reception. Formed from concepts and 
discourses that circulated throughout Europe – evident in medieval traditions 
such as courtly love, the dialogic form, and the use of exempla, as well as in its 
appropriation of elements from Petrarch, Seneca, and the humanistic comedies 
developed in Italy2 – Celestina’s engagement with its origins is nevertheless not 
unquestioning or uncritical; indeed, it reveals them to be not rigid taxonomies 
but conventions capable of adaptation and modification. This dynamic process 
is intrinsic to the work’s textual development, as much scholarship has shown: 
2. On Celestina’s medieval antecedents see Pattison (2009), Deyermond (2003 [1961]), and 
Fothergill-Payne (1988). Di Camillo (2010, 2012) raises the possibility that Celestina was written 
in Italy (possibly Florence), given the influence of Italian humanist culture on the work. 
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an anonymous fragment apparently found by Rojas and turned into a sixteen 
act comedia, which was then transformed into the twenty-one act tragicomedia 
that in turn came to be known both colloquially and in print by the title of its 
eponymous character, Celestina.3
The paratextual material, in particular the prologue appended to the twen-
ty-one act tragicomedy, reveals an author who is fully aware that meaning is not 
constant or fixed but rather open and mobile. This is particularly clear in the 
statement Rojas makes about how each of his own readings of the found frag-
ment brought to the fore “nuevas sentencias”.4 Reading is characterised as an 
act determined by a nexus of circumstances: among them age, status, education 
and, of course, purpose: 
Así que cuando diez personas se juntaren a oír esta comedia en quien quepa esta 
diferencia de condiciones, como suele acaecer, ¿quién negará que haya contienda en 
cosa que de tantas maneras se entienda? (2000: 20)5
The Tragicomedia’s prologue gives an account of the struggle for interpre-
tive authority that begins with a borrowing of Petrarch’s reference to Heracli-
tus, continues with imagery of the conflict endemic in all acts of creation, and 
concludes with mention of reading strategies and the interfering punturas made 
by the work’s printers. But it comes to us most clearly in the depiction of the 
comedia’s reception and the challenges of the earliest readers who, if Rojas is to 
be believed, resisted the initial interpretation of the narrative and pushed him to 
return to the text, to re-read, re-interpret, and re-work it. 
This article takes as its starting point the interpretative openness and evolu-
tion of meaning that occurs through reception, as described in the prologue to 
the Tragicomedia. It is not concerned with genetic influence or sources, or indeed 
authorial intention, but with the way a work can be understood differently as 
it moves through time. As the prologue intimates, each new act of engagement 
by an audience has the potential to bring to the fore meanings that may not 
have been intended or even conceivable at the moment of composition. Studies 
of literary reception have frequently been undertaken diachronically; but they 
do not necessarily have to be done this way. Taking my cues from the dynamic 
3. I will not be addressing the question of the work’s authorship. Much valuable research has 
been done on this issue, as on Celestina’s textual transmission. For an overview of the various 
arguments, see the introduction to the recent edition by Canet Vallés (2011: particularly pp. 11-
30). Regarding the work’s title in its European print history, the articles by Berndt Kelley (1985), 
Kirkby (1989), and Lawrence (1993a) are also useful.
4. We should not forget that authors are themselves first and foremost readers. Snow articulates 
this in a study of Rojas as the initial reader of the found fragment (1995).
5. Unless otherwise stated, all citations from Celestina are taken from the Crítica edition prepared 
by Lobera et al (2000). References to page numbers will be made in parentheses in the main body 
of the article.
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process described by Hans Robert Jauss’ flawed if useful concept of “horizon of 
expectations”, I propose a synchronic reading of Celestina’s sixteenth-century 
European reception, focusing primarily on Spain and Italy.6 It is important to 
recognise that a synchronic approach is not only chronological but spatial. As al-
ready noted Celestina was forged from a transnational environment and formed 
part of an emergent “European” culture. This transnational character can clearly 
also be seen in Celestina’s reception. The many translations it underwent (into 
most European vernaculars not to mention Hebrew and Latin) and the number 
of continuations and adaptations it spawned are further testament of the appeal 
it held across linguistic and cultural boundaries, and of its status as a key inter-
locutor in the context of sixteenth-century European literature and thought.7 
As the term “horizon” suggests, a synchronic history of reception examines not 
only the contemporary literary context of a particular time and place – what was 
being written, printed, and circulated concurrently – but also the wider philosoph-
ical and social background. Existing studies have frequently sought to understand 
Celestina according to the ideological context of its composition as well as its sourc-
es or influences.8 José Luis Canet Vallés, Ottavio Di Camillo, and Consolación 
Baranda have all individually addressed the link between context and text, inter-
preting Celestina in relation to late fifteenth-century philosophical debates.9 This 
article does not seek to supplant such readings but to complement them. It builds 
6. First appearing in his Literaturgeschichte als Provokation (1970) and subsequently in a collec-
tion of his essays in English (1982), Jauss’s theory can be understood as signifying the expecta-
tions, experiences and conventions which condition the literary context in which a work is both 
produced and received. For a critical appraisal of the concept of “horizons of expectation” see 
Holub (1984: 53-69, particularly p. 59). 
7. Snow’s histories of the reception of Celestina are invaluable (1997, 2001), as is the work of 
Parrilla (2010). Lida de Malkiel provides a thorough analysis of the artistic relationships between 
Celestina and its continuations (1962). On the Italian translations, see the edition and studies by 
Kish (1973, 1992). On the French translation of Celestina, see the editions by Brault (1963) and 
Drysdall (1974); Serrano provides a more recent overview of its history there (2008). The German 
context of its reception and the two translations by Christof Wirsung have also been looked at by 
Kish and Ritzenhoff (1980) and more recently by Carmona Ruiz (2006, 2007). On the English 
translation by James Mabbe see the editions by Severin (1969) and Martínez Lacalle (1972), and 
more recently Pérez Fernández (2013).
8. See Bataillon (1961), Fothergill-Payne (1988), and Maravall (1964), to name only several. 
Lawrence’s article on Celestina’s moralité provides another socio-historic interpretation of Celes-
tina. Like Maravall, he proposes that the work’s moral is not religious or spiritual but social, and 
is concerned with issues of civic responsibility and civil order (1993b: particularly pp. 92-93, 99).
9. Canet Vallés argues that Celestina was influenced by and engaging critically with late fifteenth-
century debate about scholasticism (2011: 30, 53, in particular pp. 83-96). Di Camillo believes that 
the Comedia responds to the contemporary issue of educational reform (2010, 2012) and intersects 
with debates between different schools of moral philosophy and ethics, in particular the polemic about 
Epicureanism (1999). For Baranda (2004), the work’s morality stems from its engagement with “los 
planteamientos del neoepicureísmo, una corriente de pensamiento menos rara, marginal o heterodoxa 
en su momento de lo que con el paso de los años se ha podido pensar” (2004: 37-38).
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on the valuable work of these scholars but takes a somewhat different perspective, 
turning away from Celestina’s moment of conception to consider its reception. It 
argues that such ideological context should likewise be viewed as a factor governing 
the popularity and significances the work held for its sixteenth-century audience, 
focusing on one particular philosophical strand central to medieval and Renais-
sance thought: namely, debates about the misery and dignity of man.
The Misery and Dignity of Man
The nature of humanity is by no means a new topic, stretching back as it does 
to antiquity; it is a theme that can be found in many a classical, medieval and 
Renaissance text, albeit approached from a variety of perspectives.10 Among the 
many to have been written on the subject, one work holds a particularly funda-
mental position in Medieval and Renaissance debates about the human condi-
tion: Pope Innocent III’s twelfth-century treatise, De miseria humanae conditio-
nis, also known as De contemptu mundi. A compendium of well-known ideas 
already in circulation about the misery and misfortune of man rather than an 
original work, De miseria attempts to demonstrate the worthlessness of material 
things and to persuade readers to flee worldly corruptions. It had an enormous 
diffusion and influence across Europe and survives in more than six hundred 
manuscripts (including twenty-three extant manuscripts in the Iberian Penin-
sula), many printed editions, and prose and verse translations.11 Innocent con-
ceived of the treatise as a diptych, with part one, which was devoted to man’s 
wretched state, being countered by a second part on man’s dignity.12 This sug-
gested second section was never written. The treatise that he did write, however, 
acted as a powerful point of reference in the minds of medieval and renaissance 
authors: over the course of subsequent centuries an intertextual discourse de-
veloped between De miseria and many works that sought to resolve the issues 
it collated.13 Celestina is fundamentally concerned with what it means to be 
human. I would contend that when read in the context of these debates and 
alongside other works that, despite varying aims and methods, were engaged in 
10. Some of the foundational research on the European context of the debate about human mis-
ery and dignity has been done by Bultot (1964), Trinkaus (1970), and Kristeller (1972), whose 
studies provide valuable resources and bibliographic references. For more recent considerations, 
see Vega (2003; 2011), Clúa Ginés (2003), Granada (2003) and the essays in Cappelli (2006). 
11. Rodríguez Rivas provides details about De miseria’s manuscript and print history in Spain 
(1990). On its European diffusion more generally see Bultot (1964).
12. Innocent states in his prologue: “Si vero paternitas vestra suggesserit, dignitatem humane 
nature Christo favente describam, quatinus ita per hoc humilietur elatus, ut per illud humilis 
exaltetur” (Innocent 1955: 3). 
13. This is noted by Murchland (1966), who juxtaposes De miseria alongside a response by Gian-
nozzo Manetti, De dignitate et excellentia hominis (1452), and more recently by Vega (2003, 2011).
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conscious examination of the human condition, it could also have been viewed 
as an interlocutor in this open-ended discourse. 
Comparatively little scholarship has so far systematically investigated Celes-
tina’s reception using a wider ideological framework such as this.14 María José 
Vega’s research provides one possible explanation as to why this may be. Certain 
texts are liable to be “misdiagnosed” or neglected by scholars because, as Vega 
maintains, they do not fit neatly into modern binary categorisations that relate 
misery with the medieval and dignity with the Renaissance.15 Vega gives the 
example of Fernán Pérez de Oliva’s Diálogo de la dignidad del hombre (1546) 
as one work that has been mislabelled and too readily placed with others that 
make an explicit case for man’s dignity (2009: 123-132) – a “misdiagnosis” that, 
as a result, underplays the pessimistic tone of half of the original dialogue. Her 
studies underscore the necessity of considering how periodisation affects the 
interpretation of texts, an issue previously shown by Pattison (2009) to be pres-
ent in scholarship on Celestina. Maintaining that misery and dignity need to be 
thought of as “temas complementarios y no contradictorios” (2011: 5-6) – as 
indeed Innocent viewed them – Vega critiques traditional binary approaches 
that overlook aspects discernible in some sixteenth-century texts (such as the 
Epicurean tradition that denies Providence), and that also sideline medieval 
concepts of man’s dignity. Her research suggests that debates about the human 
condition are multi-stranded because they include texts from a variety of genres 
and make use of different motifs at various points, and because the meaning of 
labels such as “misery” and “dignity” evolves as new texts become part of the 
dialogue. Ultimately, Vega’s approach is useful because it highlights the liminal 
position of those literary works, such as Celestina, that do not easily fit into 
generic categories. 
14. As noted, previous studies have often sought to understand Celestina from the perspective of its 
composition. Baranda (2004: 66), Canet Vallés (2011: 73-82, 83-96), and Di Camillo all underline 
Celestina’s evident interest in the human condition and include debates about the misery and dignity 
of man in their discussions. Di Camillo argues that the phrase “dignidad del hombre” – uttered by 
Sempronio in Act I – is not found in a vernacular text in the fifteenth century before Celestina; a 
usage that he links directly to the circulation of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Oratio de hominis 
dignitate from 1486 (1999: 80; 2010: 114-15, notes 33 and 34). See also the earlier essays by Alcalá 
(1976) and McPheeters (1982) on Neo-Epicurean elements. Furthermore, in general scholars have 
tended to approach issues associated with debates about the human condition individually rather 
than associating them with any wider philosophical strand. For example, pessimism, fortune, man’s 
subjected state, and the role of the divine have been dealt with, particularly in relation to Pleberio’s 
lament – on which Corfis (2001) provides a useful summary of scholarship up to 2000. One scholar 
for whom the human condition and dignity form a key aspect of his work is Rodríguez Puértolas 
(1976), who notes that certain characters are highly conscious of themselves and their personal 
value. More recently, Gerli has returned to what he sees as the “disquieting and conflictive rather 
than consolatory, skeptical rather than believing, pessimistic rather than confident” message of the 
work, suggesting that Rojas anticipates later interest in these philosophical concerns (2011: 30). 
15. See Vega (2009: in particular pp. 120-122).
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It may be, therefore, that Celestina has been overlooked for the reasons Vega 
outlines: perhaps because it does not adhere to the formal expectations of philo-
sophical or theological genres or because the subject does not at first appear to 
be an explicit concern of Rojas, despite his obvious interest in human nature. 
Whatever Rojas’s intentions, when read against a new horizon created by the 
evolving discourse about the misery and dignity of man, certain features of his 
depiction of the human condition may be seen in a new light. Furthermore, 
taking into account the two-way, reciprocal nature of literary reception – what 
Jauss called the “socially formative” function of literature16 – I would suggest 
that Celestina’s position on the threshold of periods and ways of thinking allows 
it a unique perspective upon contemporary ideologies and conventions. Like 
the voices of the marginal characters in the narrative, it does not represent a 
main interlocutor in the debate about man’s nature but interacts from the side-
lines like an aparte or aside, glossing, critiquing or qualifying what is being said 
in the “central” discourse.17 
As already suggested, a synchronic approach to reception looks at the textual 
and literary as well as ideological contexts of the “horizon” in question – i.e. what 
was printed, circulated, and therefore potentially read simultaneously. I propose to 
read Celestina against works that were already associated with this central discourse 
on the human condition. Two in particular stand out as being particularly useful for 
examining how Celestina informs and is informed by the context in which it is read, 
and how elements of it can be seen to surpass its medieval antecedents. These are Pe-
trarch’s De remediis utriusque fortunae (1366), a dialogue between the allegorical fig-
ures of Reason, Sorrow, and Joy, and the aforementioned Diálogo de la dignidad del 
hombre by Pérez de Oliva.18 The debt owed to Petrarch by Rojas has been examined 
in detail by Deyermond (2003 [1961]). My aim is not to develop his ideas about 
how Petrarch’s De remediis shaped the meaning of Celestina but to consider how 
Celestina moves beyond the meanings of the discussion suggested by De remediis.19 
16. For Jauss, literary reception entails an exchange between the horizon of a work’s production and 
the horizon of its reception. This exchange not only produces new meanings, it is also socially forma-
tive. That is, the gap between a reader’s expectations and what they encounter, which is brought to light 
in the process of reading, modifies perceptions and unsettles assumptions and norms (1982: 39-41).
17. In a comment that highlights the critical perspective provided by texts outside of “central” dis-
courses, Rozzo remarks that “novellas, poems or plays narrated easily understandable ‘stories’ while also 
conveying unedifying, irreverent or even blatantly heterodox views on the world and traditional reli-
gious values. And they were also views that became more subversive and attractive, the more they were 
put forward in the ‘amusing’ and unconventional settings depicted by literary works” (2001: 205).
18. Petrarch describes the dialogue De tristitia et miseria, which was later included in De remediis, thus: 
“Id vero nihil est aliud, quam humanae conditionis exquiere dignitatem” (Seniles, XVI, 9). See Rawski’s 
commentary in his translation of De remediis (1991: vol. 2, I, xviii), and Rico (1974: 170, n. 161).
19. Like Celestina, Petrarch’s work was highly popular in the sixteenth century and circulated 
concurrently. On the manuscript reception of De Remediis, see Mann (1971) and for data about 
its print history see Hankins (2007-2008). Readers of Celestina in the sixteenth century were 
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In contrast there has to my knowledge been no comparative study of the Diálogo de 
la dignidad del hombre and Celestina. Baranda is so far the only scholar I have come 
across who has linked the two works: “Las palabras de Aurelio ofrecen significativas 
coincidencias con el punto de vista de Rojas porque desarrollan también la primera 
parte del libro VII de la Historia Natural de Plinio. Aurelio ofrece un desolador 
panorama de la condición humana, desgranando los distintos aspectos de la miseria 
hominis en términos que coinciden con el prólogo de La Celestina” (2004: 66). 
And yet there are good reasons why this later work makes a particularly valuable 
interlocutor in the context of discussions about misery and dignity. 
The editio princeps of the Diálogo was printed in 1546 in Alcalá de Henares 
by Juan de Brocar and included in a collection of works edited by Francisco 
Cervantes de Salazar. A second Spanish edition was printed in 1586 by Gabriel 
Ramos Bejarano in Cordoba, edited by Pérez de Oliva’s nephew, Ambrosio de 
Morales. The Diálogo was translated into Italian by Alfonso de Ulloa, a man also 
closely associated with Celestina’s appropriation in Italy as well as the transla-
tion of culture between the two peninsulas more generally, and printed under 
Ulloa’s name three times in Venice by Nicolò Bevilacqua (1563 and 1568) and 
Francesco Rampazetto (1564).20 Thus the work was in circulation alongside the 
Tragicomedia. As with Celestina, the Diálogo’s originality rests in its use of the 
vernacular to address themes that had otherwise been the preserve of texts in 
Latin.21 Despite formal and generic differences, both works are interested in 
what it meant to be human yet do so at times from a paradoxical perspective 
that demonstrates at once man’s simultaneous potential for dignity and misery.22 
Furthermore, both Celestina and the Diálogo provoked responses to the prob-
lems of reading and were subject to re-writings and continuations that sought 
to censor their messages and smooth out their ambiguities.23 The debate over 
the didactic and moral intention of Celestina is by no means a phenomenon of 
modern scholarship. Sixteenth-century audiences and critics also disagreed over 
its benefits and dangers; indeed, contemporary reception of the work was no less 
characterised by the inability of readers to agree on its value.24 Yet, despite the 
clearly able to make links between the two, as discussed by Lage Cotos in her article on the way in 
which Petrarch is used by the sixteenth-century writer of the Celestina comentada (2005).
20. For bibliographic documentation of the print history of the Diálogo see Cerrón Puga’s intro-
duction (1995: 11-97, particularly pp. 43-57) and Vega (2009: particularly pp. 106-114).
21. See Vega (2003: 9).
22. Such differences should not prevent us from reading the two comparatively; sixteenth-centu-
ry readers were accustomed to making connections between disparate texts through the practice 
of compliatio. 
23. The fact that Celestina inspired such continuations and corrections is of course not an un-
common feature of the treatment of late medieval works of literature in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, as the reception of Cárcel de amor or Amadis de Gaula shows.
24. The vacillation between vituperation and approval has been looked at by Chevalier (1976) 
and Gagliardi (2007). Throughout the sixteenth century there were consistent demands from 
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consistent opposition and criticism Celestina faced it escaped official censorship in 
Spain throughout the sixteenth century and was not expurgated until the Indexes 
of Zapata (1632) and Sotomayor (1640).25 Though the Portuguese Inquisition 
prohibited it in 1581, the work was not placed on a Spanish Index of banned 
books in its entirety until the eighteenth century.26 Indeed, it remained a best-
seller in Spain throughout the sixteenth century.27 In Italy, it remained a regular 
feature of the Italian presses until the 1560s; yet it did not appear on any list of 
banned books issued by an Italian office or state until 1593.28 Kallendorf explains 
this apparent change in popularity as a consequence of a shift in market demand, 
which turned towards works of devotional and spiritual content, but also pro-
poses that Inquisitorial investigations into printers and booksellers may have been 
influential.29 This is not to say that Celestina did not still circulate; it would be 
simplistic to assume copies of earlier editions suddenly disappeared from the read-
ing public. But it may be that despite not being prohibited until much later it had 
become difficult to sanction its publication in the atmosphere of increasing spiri-
tuality and religious reformation that characterised the latter half of the century. 
Furthermore, a lack of official state or ecclesiastical prohibition does not pre-
clude a work from posing questions of a potentially problematic nature to its audi-
clerics and scholars, among them Juan Luis Vives, who called it the “nequitiarum parens”, to 
have the work prohibited and existing copies recalled and destroyed. Nevertheless, Celestina was 
simultaneously considered a work of great style as well as moral merit: witness the dedication by 
Simón Borgoñón in the 1570 Salamancan edition printed by Mathias Gast, in which Borgoñón 
claims that it was suitable if not necessary reading material for clerics (cited in Gagliardi 2007: 
69-70), presumably so they could keep an eye on “lo que passa en la vida”.
25. On the seventeenth century expurgations, which sought to expunge blasphemous material 
and religious references, see Green (1947) and Gagliardi (2007: 74-77).
26. Of the continuations, only the Segunda Celestina by Feliciano da Silva, referred to as the 
Resurrection de Celestina, appears in a Spanish Index (Valdés 1559).
27. Kallendorf remarks that there exists a double standard in the outrage the work’s obscenity pro-
voked and its simultaneous consistent appeal to audiences and position as a “best-seller” (2003: 78). 
Is it possible that Celestina managed to evade being expurgated or placed on the Index of banned 
books earlier because it was so commercially successful? It is known that the book industry took ac-
tive steps to fight censorship and protect the businesses by appealing to the official bodies responsible 
and contesting the Indexes, as occurred in Venice in 1549, 1554/55, and 1559 (Grendler 1977: 85, 
99-101), or in Barcelona where booksellers refused to purchase copies of the 1584 Index and con-
tinued to sell otherwise prohibited items (Kamen 1997: 117-118). It has also been noted that official 
censors were more concerned with the potential for heresy in religious rather than secular works, and 
that literary merit was an important factor (Whinnom 1980: 190) – for example, Alvar Gómez de 
Castro in his writings on the principles of censorship defended certain otherwise “harmful” works, 
such as Celestina or Amadis de Gaula, for being of good quality.
28. Celestina Comedia di Calisto & Melibea appears in the Roman Index of 1593, which was based 
on the Spanish and Portuguese Indexes of 1583 and 1581 respectively; on which see Bujanda (1994: 
320, 323, 366, 906). Rozzo notes that the list of 1593 had a very restricted circulation and that certain 
works, such as Celestina, were not added to the 1596 Index of Clement VIII (2001: 206-207).
29. Kallendorf focuses specifically on the press of Gabriele Giolito, the last to print Celestina in 
Italy in the sixteenth century (2003: 82-84). See also Grendler (1977: 133).
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ence. It is generally now accepted that censorship is not simply a top-down process 
of repression and oppression but one that traverses the public and private spheres 
and can become naturalized as the accepted limit or decorum of a particular dis-
course in which various agents – editors, printers, and readers – are complicit.30 It is 
this type of “soft” censorship that Celestina is subject to in the sixteenth century. As 
can be seen in the translations it underwent, and also in the dialogue that it inspired 
with later readers who sought to amend aspects of the original work in subsequent 
adaptations and continuations, some of which I will address at a later point. 
If we turn to the Diálogo de la dignidad del hombre, we find a similar kind of 
response. Francisco Cervantes de Salazar was inspired by Pérez de Oliva’s ambigu-
ous ending to “complete” the Diálogo.31 His additions, which were later purged by 
Morales from his 1586 edition, alter the work’s message by erasing the vagueness 
of Dinarco’s judgement and have Aurelio concede defeat and be persuaded by the 
additional arguments for man’s dignity that the former provides.32 In the title of 
Cervantes de Salazar’s version and the Italian translations by Ulloa emphasis is 
placed on the dignity of man as on the moral benefits brought by reading the work:
Esta presente obra y Dialogo de la dignidad del hombre el qual començo en alto 
stilo y muy profundamente el maestro Oliva y lo prossiguio con grande eloquencia 
summa erudicion y mucha doctrina Francisco Cervantes de Salazar todo para recon-
oscer los dones y beneficios que de dios recebimos para emendar nuestras faltas y poqdades 
para doctrina enseñamiento de nuestras vidas’ (1546: fol. lxxx[r]; my emphasis).33
30. See the introduction by Vega and Weiss to Reading and Censorship in Early Modern Europe 
(2010: particularly pp. 10-14). Essays in the collection, e.g. those by Fragnito (2010) and Weiss 
(2010), build upon the research of scholars of Early Modern England who initiated a new per-
spective on “soft” censorship (for references see Vega and Weiss 2010: 10 note 4) as well as inves-
tigations by scholars of Renaissance Italy, France, and the Iberian Peninsula who have pursued a 
similar interpretation (see Vega and Weiss 2010: 12-14 for bibliography).
31. The title page of Cervantes de Salazar’s edition (1546) reads: “Obras que Francisco Ceru-
antes de Salazar a hecho, glosado, y traduzido. [...] La segunda es un dialogo de la dignidad del 
hombre donde por manera de disputa se trata de las grandezas y maravillas que ay en el hombre, 
y por el contrario de sus trabajos y miserias, començado por el maestro Oliva, y acabado por 
Francisco Cervantes de Salazar [...].” Abbreviations have been silently expanded here and in 
citations elsewhere but original orthography and punctuation are otherwise preserved.. Baranda 
remarks that his use of the term “acabar” suggests that Pérez de Oliva’s version was left unfin-
ished; yet “completing” the work is not as straightforward as Cervantes de Salazar would have 
readers believe: rather than merely adding a hitherto absent ending, Oliva’s original conclusion 
has to be excised (“hasta aquí llegó el maestro Oliva, lo que adelante hasta el fin se sigue com-
puso Cervantes de Salazar”) to make way for what is presented as entirely new but is in fact a 
re-working (2003: 22).
32. Baranda’s article is a useful reference point for the effects of Cervantes de Salazar’s changes on 
the meaning of the original work, representation of its characters, and structure which “están en-
caminadas a un doble propósito: hacer un elogio de la dignidad humana, pero también modificar 
el diálogo de Pérez de Oliva desactivando los elementos que contribuían a su ambigüedad, cegar 
la posiblidad de dejar en tablas una disputa sobre el hombre” (2003: 25).
33. It cannot be confidently stated whether such rubrics were added according to the wishes 
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Thus, in much the same way as Innocent originally conceived De miseria, 
the Diálogo is presented as a catalyst that enables man to recognise the truth 
about his nature and consequently amend his behaviour; yet in his engagement 
with Pérez de Oliva’s original work Cervantes de Salazar simultaneously chooses 
to underline only one possible aspect of the human condition. While there was 
a tendency to resolve or gloss over the ambiguities of both the Diálogo and Ce-
lestina, the effect of reading these two works alongside one another could have 
been to keep alive these very uncertainties in the minds of those familiar with 
both texts. Rather like the subversive apartes of its untrustworthy marginal char-
acters, Celestina provided an oblique perspective on the portrayal of the human 
condition in contemporary debates. 
Self-knowledge and Solitude
Celestina’s intersection with debates about the misery and dignity of man can 
be approached via various themes, among them language, gender and age. For 
the purposes of this article, however, I will be providing a case study of two in 
particular that reveal Celestina’s hitherto underestimated role as an interlocutor 
in this discourse: self-knowledge and solitude. These ideas are intimately con-
nected in medieval and Renaissance discussions of the human condition – the 
treatises of Innocent, Petrarch and Pérez de Oliva are obvious examples – and 
lie at the heart of conceptions of man as an individual and social being. 
Summed up by the popular Latin tag “Nosce te ipsum”, the concept of self-
knowledge has its origins in Greek philosophy and involves the idea that the 
search for truth had to originate from an understanding of oneself.34 In medi-
eval Christian and ascetic traditions the point of this quest for self-knowledge 
was unity with God. In the Renaissance this aim continued to hold sway with 
Neo-Platonists such as Marsilio Ficino, who believed that knowledge unified 
the subject and the world and, to quote Ernst Cassirer, strove “to overcome the 
separation in the elements of being and return to the point of their original 
unity” (1963: 134). 
By definition, then, the quest for self-knowledge thus entails the exclusion 
of external elements, or, as David Aers comments, “a move from the outer per-
son to the inner” (1992: 183). Bernard Murchland conceptualizes solitude as a 
consequence of the failure to fully and willingly accept the truth about oneself 
rather than being part of the process by which it is found: 
of Cervantes de Salazar and Ulloa or by the printers, who often made such adjustments, as the 
argumentos in Celestina attest. If the latter, this brings an additional layer of participation in the 
multi-stranded discourse that characterises the reception of this work.
34. Bennett (1982) and Aers (1992) provide information about the classical works and authors 
upon which medieval and Renaissance ideas about self-knowledge were based.
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man “may either pursue the path of self-identity, meaning, and wholeness; or, on 
the other hand, he may continue to stumble through the ‘unending labyrinths’ of 
destruction and alienation” (1966: xix; my emphasis). 
Murchland’s words suggest a familiar polarisation of available philosophical 
choices: man can either choose to be one thing or another. When we involve 
Celestina as an interlocutor in this debate, however, it becomes clear that this 
binary opposition is not so simple. One form of “solitude” may facilitate self-
knowledge – as De miseria, De remediis, and the Diálogo de la dignidad del hom-
bre all suggest – but self-knowledge can also lead to another, less comforting, 
form of solitude: not that of the philosopher, freed from worldly affairs, but 
existential alienation, loneliness, and estrangement.35 
Innocent’s aim in De miseria was to show his readers the truth about human 
nature, thereby encouraging them to turn to the divine and find humility and, 
through this, salvation. Ascetic meditation of the type seen in his treatise attacks 
worldly distractions and vices such as pride because their effect is to make man 
“ignorante de su naturaleza y olvidadizo de su fragilidad. El copioso discurso de 
las miserias humanas no tendría otro fin que el de recordársela de forma incesante” 
(Vega 2011: 7).36 In order to bring about the contempt necessary for humility, 
man had to be brought to a thorough understanding of the deceits of the world, 
but most importantly of the vileness of humanity: Innocent declares that wise men 
who spend their lives seeking knowledge externally, in and through the world, 
will seek truth in vain, because the truth (and therefore the way to exalt God) 
lies within: “Deficiunt ergo scrutantes scrutinium, quoniam accedit homo ad cor 
altum, et exaltabitur Deus” (1980: 110-111). This interiorisation of the search for 
truth is also found in works that responded to Innocent’s provocative treatise. As 
already noted, while such responses did not necessarily take the same approach, 
often they did share motifs. The injunction “know thyself”, for example, directly 
informs the message of several dialogues in both books of Petrarch’s De remediis.37 
Petrarch advocates, as Innocent does, that the only truly useful knowledge is that 
35. On the idea of alienation in Renaissance literature generally, see Howard (1974: 48-49) and 
Vega (2009: 121-122); and in relation to Celestina specifically, see Rodríguez Puértolas (1976: 
158-163) and more recently Gerli (2011: 23). 
36. Resonances of this incessant reminder of what man is can be found in other late medieval 
texts, even those not traditionally associated with the misery and dignity of man debate such as 
Jorge Manrique’s Coplas, also a sixteenth-century “best-seller”, whose opening line “Recuerde el 
alma dormida” seeks a similar awakening. On which see Marino’s most recent work (2011).
37. An analogous work to De remediis in which self-knowledge features as the primary issue is Se-
cretum, on which see Rico (1974). A self-conscious examination of Petrarch’s relationship with the 
divine, Secretum is an example of the author’s Christian humanism – it deals, for example, with the ne-
cessity of free will in faith. It informed Petrarch’s later thoughts on Fortune but never reached the same 
heights of popularity as De remediis. According to Deyermond, Rojas borrows only one sentence from 
Secretum, this coming from the Index, and the work itself was not engaged with directly (2003: 77). 
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about the self, as Reason explains in the dialogue “De Sapientia”: “Hoc est pro-
prium sapientis, imperfectionem suam nosse ac fateri” (2002: I, i, 62).38 
Both Innocent and Petrarch acknowledge, albeit in different ways, that the 
ability to successfully negotiate the path to self-knowledge does not take place in 
a vacuum but is conditioned by contextual factors such as wealth, material com-
fort, or social ties; in other words, it cannot be separated from one’s engagement 
with the world and others. Innocent tends not to address these contextual factors 
directly in much detail but there is a sense in the work that withdrawal from the 
world also means retreat from society. As Murchland notes, De miseria displays a 
“solitary contempt of man and the created order” (1966: xvi). The twelfth-century 
cleric shows relatively little interest in man as a social being. On the few occasions 
when he depicts human relationships (such as those between master and servant, 
man and wife) he represents them as troublesome burdens that ensnare man in 
sinful passions and draw him deeper into the world; or as part of the general 
environment of conflict and strife, one of the many enemies that man faces, and 
therefore barriers to self-knowledge. 
Though undoubtedly forming part of contemporary debates about the mis-
ery and dignity of man, Petrarch’s conceptualisation of the human condition 
responded to and was conditioned by a different social context to that of the 
penitential or ascetic environment with which De miseria is associated. We find 
greater consideration of man as a social being in De remediis, probably because 
Petrarch was more interested in providing guidance and consolation for situations 
readers could potentially face in their own lives. As such, the positive side of social 
relationships is acknowledged: for example, in the dialogue “De Vicinis Importu-
nis” man is called “politicum et sociale animal” (2002: I, ii, 706), after Aristotle’s 
definition of man as zoon politikon. Nevertheless, this is countered by the admis-
sion that true understanding of self and world requires isolation. Petrarch admits 
in the same dialogue that of all species in the world, humans alone are defined by 
consistent conflict, offering a familiar list of the torments that arise from social 
interactions.39 The dialogue ends with the advice that “Si penitus ab hac peste vis 
absolvi, in solitudinem te reconde” (2002: I, ii 706), a message that echoes earlier 
discussion in “De Viridariis”, where Reason poses the rhetorical question to Joy 
that “Quanto autem gloriosius arido in rure exul Scipio Africanus vixerat quam 
suis in voluptatibus princeps ille Romanus?” (2002: I, i, 280).
The topos of fleeing to the countryside to escape the chaos of the city was a 
literary commonplace in vernacular texts by the sixteenth century, as illustrated 
38. Unless otherwise stated all citations from De remediis are taken from the edition by Carraud 
(2002); henceforth volume, book, and folio numbers will be given in parentheses in the main body 
of the article.
39. A common motif in works that dealt with the human condition, such torments are listed in 
De miseria and are a feature of the prologue to the Tragicomedia.
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by Antonio de Guevara’s Menosprecio de corte y alabanza del aldea (1539) – in 
Latin the Vitae rusticae encomium. And it provides a peaceful pastoral setting 
for another work devoted to exploring what it meant to be human: the Diálogo 
de la dignidad del hombre. Here solitude is introduced at the very start as a 
philosophical statement that frames the subsequent discussion and underlines 
the message that to arrive at the truth about man’s condition requires isolation 
from worldly distractions. This rhetorical setting is entirely conventional, and 
it allows Pérez de Oliva to make the link between self-knowledge and solitude 
even more explicit. However, having established the general context, the actual 
meaning of and relationship between these two concepts then varies according 
to the perspective of each interlocutor in the dialogue: Aurelio, who argues for 
man’s misery, and Antonio, who argues for his dignity. For Antonio, solitude is 
healing and edifying; it represents a space of creativity and reflection and pro-
vides necessary respite from war and all the other conflicts that beset human 
life and interactions. In contrast, for Aurelio the necessity of solitude stems 
from the abhorrence felt towards his fellow men. By employing such a strongly 
negative term as “aborrecimiento” Aurelio’s speech surpasses the approach of 
the earlier works by suggesting that there is nothing to be gained by social 
interactions. Interestingly, a marginal note printed in Cervantes de Salazar’s 
1546 edition indicates that Aurelio’s statement represents the “Argumento del 
dialogo” (fol. ii[r]). This ladillo, a common device in early printed editions 
used as a means of guiding readers through an argument, draws readers’ at-
tention to the key ideas for them to memorise, and reinforces the centrality 
of solitude to subsequent arguments that seek to uncover the truth about the 
human condition.40
Though direct reference to it is absent from Antonio’s speech, the idea of 
self-knowledge is directly addressed in Aurelio’s, and it is here that we find that 
greatest change in attitude from the type of considerations seen in earlier works 
such as De miseria and De remediis. For unlike Innocent and Petrarch, Aurelio 
does not consider self-knowledge to be a positive condition: 
quien bien considerare los daños de la vida, y los males por do el hombre pasa del 
nascimiento a la muerte, parescerle ha que el mayor bien que tenemos es la igo-
rancia de las cosas humanas, con la cual bivimos los pocos dias que duramos como 
quien en sueño pasa el tiempo de su dolor, que si tal conoscimiento de nuestras 
cosas tuviésemos cómo ellas son malas, con mayor voluntad desearíamos la muerte 
que amamos la vida. (1995: 121)41
40. This marginal note also appears in Ulloa’s translation in the 1563 and 1564 editions, in 
which ladillos appear throughout, as in Cervantes de Salazar’s edition. For a recent study of read-
ing practices in the Early Modern period see Nakládalová (2013).
41. Unless otherwise stated all citations from the Diálogo de la dignidad del hombre are taken 
from Cerrón Puga’s 1995 edition.
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It would be much better, he believes, to “carescer de aquesta lumbre, que 
tenerla para hallar nuestro dolor con ella; principalmente pues tan poco vale para 
enseñarnos los remedios de nuestras faltas” (1995: 128-129). While Cervantes 
de Salazar’s 1546 edition has only the one ladillo at this point – “Entender el 
hombre su miseria es para mas miseria suya” (fol. vi[r]) – interestingly the Ital-
ian translation adds a further two: “Miserie del l’intelletto”, and “Volendo gli 
huomini saper piu sano manco” (1564: fol. 7[r-v]). These editorial interventions 
strengthen the memorable message that knowledge of man’s miserable state is 
not always to be desired and can in fact be harmful.
For Aurelio “ignorance is bliss” because making man aware of the misery of 
his situation leads not to humility and God as De miseria contends, or consolation 
as Reason argues in De remediis, but only to more suffering. So pessimistic is the 
truth about man’s nature that being made aware of the harsh reality would inspire 
in readers a desire to end their lives – the ultimate sin – thereby rejecting hope and 
salvation, and ultimately God’s providence. The misery that Aurelio describes “no 
se funda en el pecado, ni en la caída, ni en la parte material y corruptible del hom-
bre” (Vega 2011: 20-21) and in fact it disregards the divine entirely. While God 
is a consistent presence in Antonio’s speech, in Aurelio’s he is never once men-
tioned, nor are other associated terms such as “afterlife”, “salvation”, “providence”, 
or “sin”. Aurelio speaks of an impious misery which assumes that, if God exists, 
he is cruel or at the very least indifferent to the minutiae of human destiny (Vega 
2003: 9). Man is alone in the world, subject to the powerful creative and ruling 
forces of Nature and Fortune. But for the insistence of his audience that he reveal 
all, Aurelio would rather “meteros en tal ceguedad y tal olvido que no viérades la 
miseria de nuestra humanidad, ni sintiérades la fortuna, su atormentadora” (1995: 
122). Ending with an image of nothingness, Aurelio claims to have “traído el 
hombre hasta el punto donde desvanesce” (1995: 134) and to have left “a él y su 
fama enterrados en olvido perdurable”; he questions whether Antonio will be able 
to “resusitarlo” and “dale vida [...] y consuelo” (1995: 136-137). 
By the mid-sixteenth century, then, the concept of self-knowledge as it re-
lated to the misery and dignity of man had evolved: gone is the penitential 
and ascetic view of man’s misery, replaced by an epicurean and material per-
spective.42 It is a development that I believe could have shaped the meanings 
Celestina held for sixteenth-century audiences. Although it is informed by dis-
courses and conventions that circulated in works that were part of this central 
debate about the human condition, Celestina moves beyond the horizon of its 
production and these earlier textual traditions. Instead, the horizons of its recep-
42. On this change in attitude toward the human condition evident in the Diálogo of Pérez de 
Oliva, see Vega (2003: 9). Baranda is of the opinion that the problem for Cervantes de Salazar was 
not the content of Aurelio’s beliefs (which were not in themselves original), but the fact that the 
structure of Pérez de Oliva’s version left the debate open to interpretation (2003: 22).
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tion represent ever evolving, constantly moving moments that, in time, become 
further populated, and complicated, by other works such as Pérez de Oliva’s 
Diálogo. As the literary horizon is reconfigured, and as alternative perspectives 
on human misery and dignity emerge, new meanings and different nuances 
come to light that would have been less obvious or scarcely conceivable at the 
point of Celestina’s conception.
“¿Por qué me dejaste triste y solo in hac lachrimarum valle?”
In Celestina, too, self-knowledge is advocated as a means to truth and ulti-
mately freedom from the world’s deceits. In his verses that frame the narrative 
Rojas purports to reveal the truth about the vileness of human nature and the 
dangers and traps laid by love, telling readers that his pen “Atrae los oídos de 
penadas gentes, / De grado escarmientan y arrojan su carga” (11). He also urges 
them to be aware of characters’ sins in order to learn how not to live and to turn 
their backs on destructive and ultimately futile passions, presenting the Tragi-
comedia as a mirror in which his readers will see the truth about themselves.43 
The acrostic verses are directed at lovers and seek to warn readers against loco 
amor; yet as Lawrence (1993) has demonstrated, love in Celestina has impor-
tant moral as well as social implications. These stanzas, and love in the work 
more generally, acquire a more profound, existential significance when read 
against the wider ideological context into which Celestina was received, namely 
anxiety about the dangers of vernacular fiction. Censors and critics viewed 
love as part of wider philosophical and theological debates, as well as part of 
wider fears, about the human condition: “los que amáis” could quite easily 
become “los que pecáis”. In her study of Gabriel Du Puyherbault’s treatise on 
censorship, Theotimus sive de tollendis et expungendis malis libris (1548), Dona-
tella Gagliardi (2006, 2010) discusses the association between love and impiety 
made by Puyherbault. Works dealing with amatory topics were thought to pose 
a more general moral danger to readers, leading to heresy as well as impropriety 
and social chaos:
pocos se han percatado de las amenazas que ocultan semejantes maestros de mal-
dad, y del estrecho vínculo que une, por un lado, honestas costumbres y ortodoxia, 
por otro, lujuria y herejía: quien no vive castamente acabará generando cismáticos 
e impíos. (Gagliardi 2006: 71) 
43. A commonplace image, this is found in the Italian translation of the verses by Alfonso de 
Ordóñez, which twice make reference to a “specchio”, and in Lavardin’s translation of 1578, 
which borrows the phrase “un clair mirouer” (Rojas 1974: 38); it is found also in Petrarch’s Secre-
tum where it is linked to Seneca (Naturales quaestiones, 1.17.4), who explains that mirrors were 
invented by nature “so that humans might know themselves”, and gain “some insightful advice” 
(cited in Zak 2010: 138, n. 39).
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Puyherbault’s views were not unique. In advice to the Inquisition in 1579, 
another contemporary scholar, Juan de Mariana, asserts that books like Celes-
tina should be banned because “no hay más cierto camino para la herejía que 
la corrupción general de las costumbres, ni veneno más fuerte que la lección de 
semejantes libros”.44 
Thus readers are advised in the verses that frame Celestina’s narrative to 
turn away from worldly vices such as love and control themselves “porque no os 
perdáis” (13) – a reference that gains a deeper, more serious implication in light 
of beliefs about the potential for impiety that resided in man’s passions. The 
stanzas provide a focus for contemplation of the transitory nature of the world: 
reminding readers more generally of their mortality – “Estando en el mundo 
yacéis sepultados” (13) – and that ultimately, the only truth is faith in God, they 
display religious orthodoxy and anxiety. Rojas’s ostensible position would seem 
to offer a straightforward ascetic characterisation of man’s miserable and sinful 
state – witness the “muy gran dolor” provoked by the contemplation of man’s 
condition (13). And yet, while the paratexts may proclaim a Christian message, 
it differs considerably from that of Antonio’s in the Diálogo, which sees man in 
a wholly positive light. Rojas may reiterate the necessity of having faith in God, 
but his words are hardly a promotion of man’s dignity. 
Furthermore, the actual depiction of human conduct in Celestina is ironic 
and invites a pessimistic view, establishing an affinity with Aurelio’s speech in the 
Diálogo. The pessimism of Celestina has long been acknowledged by scholars such 
as Cándido Ayllón (1965) and Alan Deyermond, the latter noting that it is now 
generally accepted that the tragicomedy goes beyond and deepens Petrarch’s per-
spective (2003: viii) – a view reiterated more recently by Baranda (2004: 30-31) 
and E. Michael Gerli (2011: 23). Baranda argues that Celestina offers no positive 
alternative to the ideologies and conventions it questions and parodies (2004: 
36); I would propose that, while not positive, an alternative perspective could 
have been suggested by the contemporary textual and ideological context in which 
it was received. When read alongside Aurelio’s speech and in the context of the 
discourse of disbelief that emerges in the course of the sixteenth century, the no-
torious ambiguities and open-endedness that characterise Celestina acquire added 
layers of significance that further challenge orthodox Christian beliefs.
Rojas apparently wants his readers to see clearly, to cast off their blindness 
in order to save themselves from worldly traps: his exhortation to readers – 
“Limpiad ya los ojos, los ciegos errados” (14)45 – appears to challenge Aurelio’s 
44. Cited in Gagliardi (2007: 61). The danger to both morality and faith posed by works that 
treated, narrated, or taught lascivious or obscene material is acknowledged in 1564 in the VII 
regula of the Tridentine index. 
45. The Italian translation retains the emphasis on seeing clearly in order to avoid being deceived: 
“Tenete questo a gliocchi per un spechio, / A cio che amando siate men decepti” (Rojas 1973: 37). 
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desire in the Diálogo to return readers to a state of blind ignorance. However, 
his emphasis on enlightenment is not positive and suggests instead that the 
truth in fact brings pain and suffering. Thus, using a common trope of medieval 
authors, he confesses to concealing it within a deceptively irreverent outer layer 
– a “píldora amarga / [...] dentro de dulce manjar” (11). This desire to protect 
readers from the harshness of reality is in sharp contrast to the anxiety Rojas 
demonstrates about interpretive openness in the prologue to the Tragicomedia 
and about the ability of his readers to profit from his “bitter pill” of truth in 
the opening verses. It is a rhetorical stance that actively allows for the possibility 
that the ultimate truth is misunderstood, for it widens the gulf separating man 
from knowledge that was supposedly beneficial and leaves it open instead to 
misinterpretation and likely misuse.46
Events in Celestina show that the truth is not only hard to deal with but 
hard to come by due to the conflict inherent in mankind. A study of how gath-
erings of people function (or not), it represents the interactions and conflicts 
of different social groups, ages, and genders.47 Aside from its use as a rhetorical 
ploy in the persuasions of Celestina, friendship is conceived by most characters 
as a necessary and vital part of human interaction if not survival, and solitude, 
on the surface at least, is presented as something better to be avoided. And yet, 
as Deyermond has argued (2003 [1961]: 117-118), Celestina goes beyond the 
Petrarchan point of view to see social interactions as potentially destructive and 
corrupting, if not toxic. While the abhorrence towards fellow men of which 
Aurelio speaks in the Diálogo is not demonstrated here, it is certainly evident 
that characters struggle to disentangle themselves from the debts and duties to 
which relationships hold them; that they are bad influences upon one another, 
encouraging lust, greed, and a disregard for anything other than worldly gratifi-
cation; that faced with the constant battle to assert their independence, power, 
and control in situations, and to resist the desires and schemes of others, the 
process of seeking out the truth of themselves and the world is arduous.
Set in a busy urban environment, there appears little chance in Celestina to 
escape to the sort of peaceful idyll so promoted by Petrarch and Pérez de Oliva. 
And yet, it is interesting that important moments of awakening, when charac-
ters explore a truth about themselves or a situation, tend to occur when they 
are alone. For Lida de Malkiel the monologues represent “conflictos anímicos 
expresados en voz alta” (1962: 124). Not only do they convey a sense of psy-
chological realism and depth, and demonstrate characters’ desire to examine 
46. Grendler notes that implicit in debates about censorship was the issue of how to read (1977: 
63-66). More recently, Gagliardi has pointed to the fears that lay behind the condemnation of 
works written in the vernacular (2007: 63, 68).
47. Deyermond has highlighted the close attention paid to the concept of man as a social being 
(2003 [1961]: 45). 
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their consciences, when set in the context I am describing here they provide 
an ironic commentary – an aparte – on the conventional association between 
self-knowledge and the philosopher’s solitude. Two characters for whom this 
is particularly true are Melibea and Pleberio. Melibea’s self-conscious explora-
tions take place when she is alone, as in Act X; she strives to find a space for 
reflection, actively seeking to avoid others, as in Act XX when she sends away 
her father and Lucrecia. Pleberio’s lament, which demonstrates the process of 
self-discovery, is only possible because of his experience of profound solitude 
(I’m assuming that Alisa is dead if not dying). Melibea’s death not only radically 
destabilises all that he knows of the world and himself but acts as the catalyst for 
a subsequent desperate search for answers and reconsideration of who he is and 
what his purpose in life has been. 
In some instances the need for solitude is a practical necessity, such as in 
Act XX when Pleberio and Lucrecia would undoubtedly physically attempt to 
stop Melibea’s suicide, a possibility of which she is quite aware: “Quiero cerrar 
la puerta, por que ninguno suba a me estorbar mi muerte” (329). In others 
it comes unbidden, a sudden jolt of loneliness forced upon them by circum-
stances, as it is for Pleberio: “¿Por qué me dejaste triste y solo in hac lachrimarum 
valle?” (347).48 In reading these solitary examinations of conscience alongside 
Aurelio and Antonio’s opening discussion in the Diálogo, it becomes clear that 
a new emphasis emerges upon solitude as a necessary creative space in which 
to find self-knowledge, whether consciously desired or not. Yet, while it is true 
that characters engage in moments of self-reflection when alone, the kinds of 
truth they reach is another matter. Rojas may not depict as directly or as openly 
as Aurelio does the negative impact self-knowledge may have, but his narrative 
radically qualifies the idea that it could lead to either the humility and salvation 
Innocent desired, or the consolation Petrarch envisaged – in other words, the 
“self-identity, meaning, and wholeness” Murchland describes. Instead Celestina 
shows how it results in physical and spiritual fragmentation and a state of es-
trangement that goes beyond concepts of the human condition seen in earlier 
medieval works such as De miseria or De remediis. 
Melibea’s language is characterised by vacillation between clarity and obfusca-
tion; I estimate that variants of the term “descobrir” occur thirty-six times in Celes-
48. Other characters also experience revelations when alone. See for example Celestina’s perambu-
latory musings at the start of Act IV, which betray a level of honesty and self-awareness she would 
never otherwise publically display. Calisto, too, experiences a sudden sense of shocked awakening, 
albeit momentarily. His soliloquy in Act XIV, which comes after he sends Tristán and Sosia away, 
opens with the comment that “¡O mezquino yo! ¡Quánto me es agradable de mi natural la solicitud 
y silencio y escuridad!» (277) The need to be alone suits his melancholic state and miserable nature; 
the “darkness” of which is speaks is figurative as well as literal: for the moment of lucidity he experi-
ences here, prompted by the circumstances of his servants’ deaths, is fleeting. He soon returns to 
carnality, having convinced himself to embrace the heady ignorance of desire once again. 
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tina in total. A third of these occasions involve Melibea, who employs it four times 
in Act X (three of which appear in her soliloquy), and twice in Act XX during the 
speech to her father. The use of “descobrir” corresponds to moments in which Me-
libea is attempting to negotiate the truth about her nature.49 The fact that it holds 
such a central position in the examination of her conscience that takes place in 
Act X’s monologue points to the importance of solitude in this process.50 All three 
times the term is used in Act X’s soliloquy share a sense of uncovering something 
that has been otherwise hidden or unknown: namely, the distressing reality about 
restrictions on women and her feelings for Calisto. Crucially, however, Melibea 
does not use this “descubrimiento” to bring about a positive transformation in 
her life, to eschew worldly dangers in favour of the divine, as Innocent suggests. 
If anything she does the opposite, rejecting the awakening it brings; a rejection 
symbolised by the “hoja de castidad”, which she uses to cover her “amoroso deseo, 
publicando ser otro mi dolor que no el que me atormenta” (220). 
Through her experience of solitude Melibea discovers an unwelcome truth: 
that what she is experiencing is a repressed sexuality, a socially unacceptable desire 
which necessitates concealment from wider society – though not necessarily from 
Lucrecia and Celestina, or obviously Calisto. But it is also more than this: the 
truth about her sexuality is not simply unacceptable according to social norms 
but, on a deeper level, painful for her to admit even to herself – perhaps because 
even at this point in the liaison she is aware that the person to whom she will ul-
timately reveal these desires, and eventually surrender her honour, is an imperfect 
and unworthy lover far removed from her vision of the ideal courtly suitor. Thus 
the “hoja” is not so much a public dissimulation but a private one used to hide the 
discrepancy between her desires and reality. George A. Shipley remarks that “It is 
not unlikely that [Melibea] is more knowing – of herself and her adversary – than 
she lets on. She has good reason to dissemble (and she has proved she can)” (1975: 
327) and observes that she negotiates the revelation of her feelings in a “conscious 
calculated manner” (1975: 330). A turning point in the action of the narrative, 
Act X’s climax is unusual because “the movement is internal and disguised” (Shi-
pley 1975: 332). Shipley’s comment hits upon the obfuscation that Melibea prac-
tices. Even when forced to reveal all to her father in Act XX she refuses to openly 
admit the truth of her desire or active role in her own dishonour. Furthermore, 
she continues the profound self-deception in which she has so far lived to such an 
extent that she is unable to acknowledge its seriousness: while recognising the ef-
fects of her death upon her family (and indeed, wrongly blaming herself alone for 
49. Brooks (2000) believes that “descubrimiento” represents a literal opening up or penetration 
of Melibea’s body and mind in the context of patriarchal control over the female body.
50. By my estimation “descobrir” occurs a six further times in monologues by Celestina (Act IV, 
twice), Pármeno (Act VIII, once), Calisto (Act XIII, once), and Pleberio (Act XXI, twice) at key mo-
ments during which they, too, search for self-knowledge and truth about the world.
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the chaos her affair with Calisto has caused) she willingly ignores the fact that she 
is about to commit the one sin that will bring permanent estrangement, not only 
from society but from the divine. Melibea’s “hoja de castidad” serves to conceal 
reality from herself; it is a figurative extension of the leaves of the books through 
which she lives out her fantasies.51 Allowing her to feign ignorance, it returns her 
to the state of metaphorical blindness or somnambulance described by Aurelio 
– the “ignorancia de las cosas humanas, con la cual bivimos los pocos dias que 
duramos como quien en sueño pasa el tiempo de su dolor”. 
Pleberio’s engagement with self-knowledge demonstrates a similar approach. 
The figurative veil of blindness falls from Pleberio’s eyes in Act XXI when, ac-
cording to Gerli, he is newly “endowed with a profound sense of consciousness 
and self-awareness” (2011: 24) and perceives man’s miserable, entrapped state. 
However, though Pleberio may be experiencing an awakening, he too, like Me-
libea, is far from fully self-aware. For if, as Petrarch and Innocent argue (albeit, 
as noted, from different perspectives), the hallmark of a wise man is to know his 
own imperfections and to admit them, Pleberio cannot be thus characterised. 
His knowledge and learning – evident in the examples from literature, legend, 
and history he, like Melibea, cites – are futile because while he awakens to the 
vileness of the world, he is unable to fully admit his own faults. Gerli believes 
that “Cut off from everyone, with no response to his pleas, [Pleberio] can only 
turn to himself in his quest for subjective understanding” (2011: 32); yet it is 
a pursuit in which the grieving father ultimately fails. Refusing to admit re-
sponsibility for his daughter’s actions he instead looks outwards to place the 
blame on external forces (the World, Love, and Fortune), even skipping over the 
failings of other individuals whom he could blame, ignoring Calisto’s lust and 
mentioning only briefly Celestina’s machinations. Given that the work is appar-
ently composed in reprehension of loco amor and untrustworthy servants and 
go-betweens it is surprising that the conclusion does not return to these specific 
problems. Instead, framed by wider debates on the human condition and by the 
alternative perspective on solitude and self-knowledge that the Diálogo de la dig-
nidad del hombre provides, Pleberio’s awakening comes to be seen as decidedly 
more existential and problematic in nature. 
While their speeches appear to be a quest for resolution as well as comfort, 
read in the light of this sixteenth-century ideological and textual horizon, what 
Melibea and Pleberio actually demonstrate is their inability to fully interiorize 
the process of acquiring self-knowledge. They are brought only to a partial state 
of awareness because of their unwillingness to fully embrace the truth of their 
natures. In this muddled awakening, the supposedly positive ends this process is 
meant to bring (humility, salvation, a bettering of the self, or consolation) do not 
51. For the concept of “living through literature”, see Severin (1989: particularly chapter 3, pp. 
23-24, and chapter 7, pp. 96-100). 
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materialise. Instead, as Aurelio forewarns, even this half-complete state of self-
knowledge leads to something far more serious: suffering, linguistic, existential 
and, in the case of Melibea, physical fragmentation; and an experience of solitude 
so profound that it brings about not the contemptus mundi that leads to salvation 
or to consolation, but estrangement from other people, the world and the divine.52 
John Edwards argues that attitudes of disbelief at this time were not uncom-
mon, stating that “it does appear that there was indeed genuine religious scepti-
cism in late medieval and early modern Europe” (1988: 21). Furthermore, in a 
remark about Inquisitorial statements, Edwards observes that 
There is a universal dimension to some of the accusations [...]. They included gen-
eralized attacks on Christianity or attacks on specific aspects of the church’s teach-
ing; blasphemy, which moved easily into humour and obscenity; materialistic views 
about this life and scepticism about an afterlife; a belief in the validity of other 
religions and the possibility of achieving salvation by following them; and finally, 
the use of magic. (1988: 13) 
Similarly, Vega contends that in the sixteenth century disbelief was a 
condición de posibilidad that was, at the very least, discursive (2008: 267-268). 
She argues that there existed a “biblioteca del ateo, disponible textualmente en 
el siglo XVI, que hubiera constituido, para decirlo con los polemistas cristia-
nos, una posible escuela de impiedad o seminario de irreligión” (Vega 2008: 270; 
emphasis author’s own). If texts provide a formal space in which the possibility 
of disbelief can be raised, there also exist ideological spaces in which orthodox 
ideas can be questioned. In the Middle Ages and Renaissance, one such ideo-
logical space was 
la consideración de la naturaleza humana, ya sea desde la antropología epicúrea, 
ya desde la experiencia de la vida social y de la ordenación del mundo. El hombre 
mismo, o el concepto de hombre, puede ser causa de ateísmo, o, más exactamente, 
puede ser la causa de una de las formas de ateísmo pleno en el Quinientos: de la 
negación de la providencia y de la inmortalidad del alma. (Vega 2008: 296) 
Although Celestina is perhaps not in itself a “disbelieving” work, it can never-
theless become one, I would argue, when read in a context in which the possibility 
of disbelief was emerging. I propose that the pessimism and nihilism expressed 
by Melibea and Pleberio would have acquired even greater significance and could 
have been seen as an even more sharply subversive message of despair and the 
denial of God’s providence when read in a horizon populated by texts that es-
poused or at the very least opened up the possibility of such a message – texts, for 
example, like the Diálogo de la dignidad del hombre.
52. On the breakdown in language caused by Pleberio’s awakening, see Gerli (2011: 26-27).
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Neither Melibea nor Pleberio deny the existence of God but their actions 
and beliefs lead them to question whether man is alone in the world in spiritual 
or religious terms. God appears very rarely in Celestina as a being with power and 
control who directly rules over characters’ lives. Jerry R. Rank argues that of the 
223 times that the term “Dios” appears in the narrative over half represent con-
ventional, formulaic usage employed to achieve certain effects within the dialogue 
yet which reveal little about characters’ (or Rojas’s) deeper religious convictions 
(1980: 77, 79). In her soliloquy in Act X Melibea appeals directly to God as the 
ultimate source of power; and yet, rather than begging his forgiveness for her 
transgressive desire and dishonesty, what she actually requests is his assistance in 
maintaining the deception that she is chaste: “húmilmente suplico des a mi herido 
corazón sofrimiento y paciencia con que mi terrible pasión pueda dissimular» 
(220). While she finally offers her soul to God and seeks protection for her parents 
– an act of faith and humility that jars with the sin she is about to commit – Meli-
bea shows a distinct lack of concern for her own spiritual salvation or damnation, 
willingly consigning herself instead to another literary trope, that of the “infierno 
de amadores” where she will be re-united with Calisto.
While he bewails the transitory nature of life, the mutability of fortune, and 
the vanity of terrestrial pursuits such as honour and wealth, in keeping with com-
mon motifs of the contemptus mundi tradition, Pleberio’s lament reveals a sense of 
isolation verging on alienation from the world, history, and other people that goes 
beyond that experienced by Innocent, standing alone before God in his contempt 
of the world, or extolled by Petrarch as a positive space of consolation. However, 
more than simply an estrangement from the worldly, his sense of alienation also 
has a philosophical if not spiritual basis.53 Masked in the medieval didactic and 
consolatory traditions from which the lament is born is a “radical nihilism” (Gerli 
2011: 24). As in Aurelio’s speech there is no mention of God as a point of com-
fort; no sense of anxiety, either, over the gross sin his daughter has committed, or 
mention of salvation, the afterlife, or the role of the divine.54 Pleberio sees death 
not as a transition to another life with religious significance as it was for Petrarch 
Deyermond, (2003 [1961]: 114) but as a final disaster (Gerli 1976: 72; 2011: 26). 
Without hope of a release to some state of being “beyond”, he remains trapped in 
the metaphorical labyrinth of which Murchland speaks – an existential “nothing-
ness”. As with Melibea, the realisation of the gulf separating the truth from his 
53. For Rodríguez Puértolas (1976: 158-163) and Howard (1974: 48-49) this alienation is 
worldly or material; they relate characters’ estrangement to socio-economic factors, and human 
actions and institutions respectively. Vega is critical of interpretations of later medieval and Re-
naissance perspectives on man’s misery such as Howard’s, believing that it not only wrongly as-
cribes collective coherence to what is a state of mind, but overlooks the potential for alternative 
views of human misery, such as the epicurean, which posit an estrangement from or rejection of 
the divine (2009: 121-122).
54. See Deyermond (1990: 173-174).
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“inner reality” leads only to pain, melancholy, and despair.55 The realisation of the 
disjunction between what both think they are and reality, or as Rodríguez Puérto-
las puts it, “la falta de adecuación entre esencia y existencia, entre el querer ser y el 
tener que ser” is what, in his words, “produce la deshumanización y la alienación” 
(1976: 166-167; emphasis author’s own). 
Gerli observes that “At the end of Celestina, Rojas confirms that it is just as 
impossible to live life like a Christian as it is to live it like a courtly lover” and that 
the work “is not followed by recantation, palinode, or enlightened understanding. 
We are left with a vision of a world that is never reconciled to conform to Chris-
tian beliefs” (2011: 28). But I would contend that further consideration of these 
points is required. Melibea’s behaviour is, as Severin has noted, inspired by books; 
her actions in turn inspire Pleberio’s pessimism. By the end of the lament he is left 
on the verge of utter despair and disbelief and does not receive comfort or answers 
within the confines of the narrative. Yet his reference to the valley of tears, with its 
allusion to consoling Psalms, does leave open possibilities for comfort, for readers 
at least if not for Pleberio himself. With the juxtaposition of Rojas’s concluding 
verses immediately afterwards readers are led to a stage beyond this ambivalence 
and pessimism that may have suggested an opportunity for salvation. It is possible 
that by framing the narrative in this way Rojas was attempting to mitigate the 
effects of any similar pessimism that Melibea and Pleberio’s joint example might 
inspire in readers, thereby pre-empting the sort of responses the work would pro-
voke. However, as with Cervantes de Salazar’s continuation of the Diálogo de la 
dignidad del hombre, which modified Dinarco’s balanced judgement in order to 
provide more explicit comfort, the reception of Celestina demonstrates that this 
moralising was not sufficient to prevent attempts to control its message in the sort 
of “soft” censorship mentioned earlier.
Later interlocutors – editors, continuers, translators, and printers – would 
seek to limit the potential influence of its denial of divine providence and treat-
ment of the ultimate sin, suicide. One such example is the translation by Jacques 
de Lavardin (1578), which attempted to contain Celestina’s pessimistic message 
and guide readers’ interpretation through the addition of a character, Ariston, 
Pleberio’s brother-in-law, whose role was to provide consolation. The grieving 
father responds to this intervention with the exclamation that “Tu m’as rendu 
la vie, tu as chassé les espesses tenebres dont la precedente douleur tenoit mon 
esprit offusqué” (1974: 256) – a comment that suggests a mind emerging from 
the darkness of ignorance and is redolent of the debate added to Pérez de Oliva’s 
Diálogo by Cervantes de Salazar, in which Aurelio renounces his earlier stance. 
Persuaded by the additional arguments presented to him by the now actively 
participating Dinarco Aurelio confesses “Quedo tan alegre, Dinarco, con el fin de 
55. On which see Aers (1992: 187) and Gerli (2011: 26).
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tu sabroso razonamiento [...], quedo alegre en haber nacido: mudando el parecer 
que al principio tenía, por liquidar bien esta materia” (1991: 136-137).
A similar process of re-writing occurs in continuations such as the Segunda 
Celestina by Feliciano de Silva (1534), Tragedia Policiana by Sebastián Fernán-
dez (1547), and Comedia Selvagia by Alonso de Villegas Selvago (1554). Not 
only do these works reveal an ongoing dialogue about the human condition 
with Celestina as a key interlocutor, they also provide clues as to how certain 
motifs and ideas were received. As with the translations, we find the elimina-
tion or modification of unpalatable elements, such as suicide, which is exorcised 
from many of the narratives. In only the Tragedia Policiana does it remain as a 
suitable solution to the heroine’s predicament: Philomena shows a similar lack 
of concern for her soul to Melibea, focusing instead on an undefined pagan af-
terlife where she will be re-united with her lover. In others, such as the Segunda 
Celestina, the heroine’s death is often (but not always) replaced by marriage, 
frequently to the lover; and we also find an increase in religious references. These 
modifications – responses to Celestina’s treatment of the human condition – 
mitigate the ultimate sin of suicide and the despair and revocation of God’s 
providence by appropriating the work’s conclusion into the realms of the so-
cially and religiously acceptable.56
Meaning in Movement
I have argued that Celestina should be seen as forming part of a network of 
texts that can be classified as responding to debates about the misery and dig-
nity of man, encapsulated by Pope Innocent III’s treatise, which was a central 
interlocutor in these discussions – texts that sought to explore what it meant 
to be human and over time created an evolving series of significances. Like 
De miseria and De remediis, Celestina is presented as a way of bringing about 
self-knowledge in readers and purports to reveal truths about man’s nature and 
existence in the world. Yet the unfolding of this process is not quite as straight-
forward – something that reading the work through the Diálogo de la dignidad 
del hombre makes clear. The fact that Melibea and Pleberio ultimately fail to 
reach a position of complete self-knowledge encourages readers to engage with 
this existential struggle for “self-identity, meaning and wholeness” themselves, 
drawing them into the debate and asking that they in turn respond to the ques-
tions and issues it raises. In spite of Rojas’s attempt to intervene, via the para-
texts, between narrative and audience, Celestina’s open-ended nature not only 
responds to but continues medieval discourses about mankind, inviting further 
questions of its own. This ongoing debate is illustrated in the sixteenth-century 
56. See Lida de Malkiel (1962: 133, 440, and 457-460).
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reception of Celestina, most obviously in translations such as Lavardin’s, and 
continuations such as the Segunda Celestina, which in turn sought to contain 
or modify Rojas’s message. 
As demonstrated by his statements in the prologues, where he explains the 
work’s development from found fragment to Comedia and then Tragicomedia, 
Rojas was fully aware of the latent conflict that characterizes the process by 
which a work is appropriated. The interpretative openness that he describes 
there continues to broaden throughout Celestina’s own reception, and in po-
tentially troubling ways, allowing other possible meanings to emerge in light of 
literary and philosophical developments that appeared subsequent to the work’s 
composition and its earlier medieval antecedents. As a comment upon the sort 
of abstract, idealised discussions over man’s nature found in contemporary trea-
tises and dialogues, Celestina demonstrates the difficultly of putting into prac-
tice this search for truth and willingly accepting the conclusions reached. It un-
dermines the humanist notion that man is centred and in control, an idea that 
appears in contemporary works such as Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Oration 
on the Dignity of Man (1486). Celestina instead shows that man is de-centred 
and fragmented, and complete self-knowledge a humanist fantasy. The concern 
manifested in the prefatory materials over the effects of truth – slippery, difficult 
to acquire, and hard to swallow – is borne out by Celestina’s conclusion, which 
demonstrates that when finally achieved even partial self-knowledge does not 
automatically lead to positive outcomes. Such anxiety becomes further height-
ened when read alongside Aurelio’s reasoning in the Diálogo that 
“Bien sabemos que en altas imaginaciones metidos munchos han perdido el seso, 
y que desta manera no podemos meter nuestra alma en hondos pensamientos sin 
peligro de su perdición” (1995: 128). 
Rojas may call for meditation upon Christ’s passion and claim to reveal the 
sins of fellow men, but the narrative provokes a more paradoxical response by 
showing that the deeds of these individuals take place in a world of wretched-
ness in which divine providence seemingly has no sway. Celestina goes beyond 
the earlier discourse about the misery and dignity of man, which sought to 
increase awe before God’s power and benevolence, reinforce the worthless of the 
worldly and the importance of the divine, or provide consolation. Rather than 
staging humility and redemption, salvation and consolation, it sets before us 
doubt and disbelief, fragmentation and alienation; it does not qualify but ques-
tions man’s relationship with the divine. Rojas may have attempted to contain 
these troubling implications, but in the horizon of sixteenth-century debates 
about the human condition, his book continued to provide an oblique per-
spective on man’s misery. In this particular context, Celestina becomes another 
voice that challenges confident belief in God, and dangerously posits a rupture 
between the human and divine. 
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